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Empty	Promises	and	Non-Incorporation			in	
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Christian	Arnold	
University	of	Mannheim	
	
Why	do	the	member	states	of	the	world’s	fourth	trading	block	incorporate	
only	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	 all	 policies	 they	 adopt?	 This	 paper	 argues	 	 that	
empty	 promises	 are	 an	 important	 reason	 for	 Mercosur’s	 incorporation	
problems	and	 that	Mercosur’s	 institutional	 design	 furthers	 such	 a	defective	
behaviour.	 Member	governments	easily	sign	agreements	whenever	they	are	
rewarded	for	the	mere	act	of	doing	so.	However,	in	case	they	expect	high	costs	
from	implementing	these	policies,	they	try	to	avoid	incorporation.	 Since	only	
the	last	state	to	incorporate	a	policy	triggers	its	overall	legal	validity,	Merco-	
sur’s	members	 can	easily	 veto	 any	agreement	ex-post.	 In	 addition	 to	empty	
promises,	 mismanaged	 drafting	 and	 incorporation,	 and	 the	 abuse	 of	 nego-	
tiation	 power	 also	 pose	 important	 obstacles	 to	 incorporation.	 Free-riding,	
however,	does	not	play	a	role.	Due	to	the	incorporation	rules,	there	can	be	no	
externalities	that	incentivise	unilateral	defection.	The	paper	substantiates	the	
arguments	 empirically	 with	 the	 multivariate	 analysis	 of	 the	 complete	
incorporation	record	of	1033	policies	adopted	between	1994	and	2008.	
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The	 member	 countries	 of	 the	 world’s	 fourth	 trading	 block	 do	 not	 keep	 all	 of	 their	
promises.	 Ever	 since	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 founded	 Mercosur	 in	
1991,	 the	 countries	 were	 criticised	 for	 negotiating	 and	 signing	 regional	 policies,	 but	
incorporating	only	two	thirds	of	them	into	domestic	law	(Bouzas	2001;	Malamud	2005;	
Ventura,	Onuki	and	Medeiros	2012).	Such	a	record	is	puzzling.	Why	would	governments	first	
sign	agreements,	but	then	refrain	from	putting	them	into	practice?	
Various	 scholars	 advance	 explanations.	 Bureaucratic	 or	 legal	 inefficiencies	 at	 the	in-	
ternational1		or	the	domestic	level2		are	important	impediments	to	incorporation.	 Others	
spotlight	 preference	 related	 issues.	 Power	 asymmetries	 between	 member	 countries	
(Eichengreen	and	Frankel	1995;	Malamud	2011;	Spektor	2010),	Mercosur’s	formal	rules	
for	incorporation	(Bouzas	 et	 al.	2008)	or	weak	enforcement	mechanisms3	 represent	
important	obstacles.	But	why	should	governments	sign	policies	already	knowing	that	they	
will	not	follow	up	on	their	promise?	 And	if	governments	adopted	a	decision	 in	 the	 first	
place,	why	would	they	try	to	prevent	it	at	a	later	point?	
This	paper	argues	that	empty	promises	are	an	important	reason	for	non-incorporation	in	
Mercosur.	Under	certain	conditions,	Mercosur’s	formal	institutions	create	incentives	to	
first	adopt	policies,	but	then	refrain	from	incorporating	them.	Governments	easily	sign	
agreements	if	the	mere	act	of	doing	so	is	rewarding.	At	the	same	time,	if	they	expect	
implementation	to	be	costly,	governments	seek	to	avoid	incorporation	and	de-facto	veto	it.	
They	can	defect	easily,	because	failing	to	follow	up	on	one’s	promise	remains	without	
serious	consequences:	First,	dispute	settlement	is	weak	and	largely	relies	on	
intergovernmental	means.	Second,	information	about	the	status	quo	of	incorporation	is	
under	disclosure.	Non-incorporators	are	hard	to	detect	and	do	not	necessarily	need	to	
fear	for	their	reputation.	
I	exemplify	empty	promises	in	two	ways.	 In	times	of	intraregional	conflict	over	single	
                                                        
1 See Bouzas and Soltz (2001b); Bouzas, Gratius, Soltz and Sberro (2008); Geneyro 
(2003); Peña (2003); Pena and Rozemberg (2005); Perotti, Stark, Vaillant and 
Ventura (2004); Ventura and Perotti (2004); Zalduendo (1998). 
2 See Bergamaschine Mata Diz (2005); Bouzas et al. (2008); Caetano and Perina 
(2003); Geneyro (2003); Nascimento (2004); Pena and Rozemberg (2005); Perotti, 
Stark, Vaillant and Ventura (2005) 
3 See Bouzas and Soltz (2001b); Bouzas et al. (2008); Geneyro (2003); Pena and 
Rozemberg (2005); Ventura and Perotti (2004); Zalduendo (1998). 
  
 
but	 salient	 issues,	 announcing	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation	can	be	 a	way	to	 signal	 a	 long	 term	
commitment	to	liberal	trade	policies	and	economic	reform.		In	addition	to	international	
audiences,	 governments	 may	 also	 address	 domestic	 actors:	 Electorally	 accountable	
politicians	 sign	 regional	 agreements,	 because	 they	 want	 to	 bolster	 their	 image	 with	
constituents.	 In	both	cases,	governments	explicitly	benefit	 from	the	mere	act	of	signing	
policies.	At	the	same	time,	they	strongly	delay	 incorporation	to	avoid	the	expected	high	
transaction	costs	from	implementation.	
The	 study	 makes	 several	 contributions.	 Empirically,	 it	 is	 the	 first	 one	 to	 present	 a	
comprehensive	data	set	on	the	incorporation	of	1033	policies	Mercosur’s	then	four	mem-	
ber	 states	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 adopted	 between	 1994	 and	 2008.	
The	multivariate	analysis	 tests	 the	mostly	anecdotal	 claims	 from	the	mainly	 legal	liter-	
ature.	 It	 finds	 that	next	 to	management	problems	and	 the	abuse	of	negotiation	power,	
empty	promises	are	an	important	piece	to	the	puzzle	of	Mercosur’s	incorporation	record.	
The	paper	also	speaks	to	theoretical	debates	and	relates	empty	promises	(Deere	2009;	
Hafner-Burton	and	Tsutsui	2005;	Marcoux	and	Urpelainen	2013)	to	the	question	of	 in-	
corporation	and	compliance	 in	 regional	 integration.	 Reflecting	 the	recently	heightened	
interest	 in	studying	regional	 integration	comparatively	 (Börzel	 	 and	 	Risse	 	2012;	 	Choi	and	
Caporaso	 2003;	 Malamud	 2010),	 it	 shows	 how	 formal	 institutions	 matter	 to	
governments’	strategic	incorporation	behaviour.	Institutions	can	provide	information	in	
a	way	that	allows	governments	to	benefit	 from	a	“signing-bonus”,	but	at	 the	same	time	
hide	subsequent	defective	behaviour.	Empty	promises	then	can	be	–	just	like	screening	or	
constraining	 (Downs,	Rocke	and	Barsoom	1996;	Lupu	2013;	Simmons	2000;	von	Stein	
2005)	–	an	important	behavioural	outcome	of	a	particular	institutional	design.	
	
	
The	Incorporation	of	Mercosur	Policies	
	
International	 cooperation	 is	 typically	 perceived	 as	 a	 chain	 of	 events:	 governments	 ne-	
gotiate,	 sign,	 incorporate,	 implement	and	 finally	comply	with	 international	agreements	
(Raustiala	 and	 Slaughter	 2003).	While	 signing	 a	 treaty	 expresses	 formal	commitment,	
this	 commitment	 is	 not	 immediately	 binding.	 Governments	 first	 need	 to	 actively	
incorporate	 a	 treaty	 into	 the	 already	 existing	 domestic	 legal	 corpus	 (Bergamaschine	
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Mata	Diz	2005;	Malanczuk	2002).	When	implementing	a	treaty,	governments	put	all	legal	
and	 institutional	 changes	 into	 practice	 that	 are	 required	 to	 enact	 the	 international	
commitment	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 This	 comprises	 incorporation,	 but	 also	 all	 other	
necessary	 institutional	 adaptions	 (Raustiala	 and	 Slaughter	 2003).	 Finally,	 compliance	
relates	 to	 the	extent	 to	which	behaviour	 is	 in	 line	with	the	terms	 laid	down	in	a	 treaty	
(Young		1979).	
	
Mercosur’s	Formal	Rules	for	Cooperation	
Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 founded	 Mercosur	 in	 1991	 and	 installed	 its	
current	 institutional	 design	 with	 the	 Protocol	 of	 Ouro	 Preto	 in	 1994	 (Bouzas	 2001;	
Ventura	and	Perotti	2004).	Member	states	adopt	decisions	unanimously	 in	either	of	 its	
three	decision	bodies,	rotating	the	presidency	on	a	6-month	basis.	The	Common	Market	
Council	is	the	highest	decision-body.	Delegations	include	the	ministers	of	foreign	affairs	and	
the	ministers	of	economic	affairs.	 Its	main	function	is	to	delineate	strategic	decisions,	 to	
watch	 over	 the	 founding	 treaty	 of	 Asunción,	 to	 formulate	 policies	 furthering	 the	 economic	
market	 and	 to	 decree	 on	 financial	 and	 budget	 decisions.	 	 The	 other	 two
  
 
bodies,	the	Common	Market	Group	and	the	Trade	Commission,	have	a	lower	position	in	
the	 institutional	 hierarchy	 –	 which	 is	 already	 reflected	 by	 the	 rank	 of	 its	 mostly	
administrative	delegations.	The	Common	Market	Group	serves	as	the	main	policy	maker	in	
Mercosur	 and	 in	 practice	 decrees	 more	 than	 two	 thirds	 of	 all	 policies.	 The	 Trade	
Commission	is	specialised	on	trade	and	the	common	external	tariff.	
Each	country	incorporates	the	exact	wording	of	the	respective	agreement	into	domes-	
tic	 law	 and	 communicates	 successful	 incorporation	 to	 the	 Mercosur	 Secretariat.4	 The	
policies	are,	however,	not	immediately	binding:	They	enter	into	force	simultaneously	in	all	
member	 countries	 thirty	 days	 after	 the	 Secretariat	 has	 received	 notice	 of	 the	 last	
member’s	incorporation.	
Enforcement	mechanisms	are	key	 for	 the	strategic	dynamics	of	 international	politics	
(Keohane,	 Moravcsik	 and	 Slaughter.	 2000).	 Even	 if	 Mercosur’s	 formal	 institutions	 for	
enforcement	 developed	 to	 some	 extent	 regarding	 independence,	 access	 and	
embeddedness	 (Arnold	 and	 Rittberger	 2013),	 Mercosur’s	 member	 governments	 largely	
remain	 in	 control.	 Measured	 with	 the	 typology	 for	 dispute	 settlement	 systems	 from	
Yarbrough	and	Yarbrough	 (1997),	Mercosur	 files	 into	 the	 second	 weakest	 category.	 In	
terms	 of	 Keohane	 et	 al.	 (2000),	 Mercosur’s	 dispute	 settlement	 system	 displays	 a	
moderate	 level	 of	 legalization	 at	most	 (Arnold	 and	 Rittberger	2013;	Haftel	2013;	Lenz	
2012).	Most	importantly,	even	despite	moderate	formal	powers,	the	dispute	settlement	
mechanism	failed	to	develop	real	leverage	in	practice	(Caetano	2011;	Vinuesa	2004).	
Finally,	 Mercosur	 has	 a	 distinctive	 approach	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 information	
about	 incorporation:	 While	 Mercosur’s	 Secretariat	 collects	 all	 data	 about	 successfully	
incorporated	policies,	this	information	is	not	publicly	available.	The	Secretariat	provides	
information	only	for	individual	regulations,	but	refuses	to	respond	to	encompassing	
queries.5	
	
	
The	Logic	of	Empty	Promises	
	
                                                        
4 While	this	had	been	good	practice	from	early	on	in	Mercosur,	decision	CMC	20/02	made	it	
formally	compulsory. 
5 The	Secretariat’s	website	allows	for	querying	the	status	quo	of	single	regulations,	only. 
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Empty	promises	in	international	relations	have	been	studied	before.	Deere	(2009)	inves-	
tigates	why	developing	countries	first	sign	trade	related	aspects	of	intellectual	property	
rights,	but	then	refrain	from	implementing	them.	Marcoux	and	Urpelainen	(2013)	show	
why	governments	contract	on	hard	law,	but	can	chose	not	to	enforce	it.	 Hafner-Burton	
and	Tsutsui	(2005)	seek	to	explain	why	some	governments	ratify	human	rights	treaties,	
but	do	not	comply	with	their	terms.	
In	general,	when	making	an	empty	promise,	delegates	consider	two	decisions:	whether	to	
sign	 an	 agreement	 and	whether	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 it.	 Self-interested	 actors	 evaluate	 the	
stages	 jointly	 and	 chose	 a	 behavioural	 strategy	 that	 maximises	 their	 overall	 output.	
Fleeting	policy	signals	 occur	under	one	premise:	any	benefit	from	signing	an	agreement	
must	outweigh	negative	 consequences.	Which	costs	and	which	benefits	occur	at	the	two	
respective	stages?		
Delegates	 may	 sign	 agreements	 to	 merely	 express	 their	 intention	 to	 cooperate.	 For	
example,	a	treaty	could	be	the	attempt	to	convince	a	domestic	constituency	about	a	general	
positive	 attitude	 towards	 international	 law	 (Dai	 2007;	 Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen	 2013).	
International	commitment	can	also	serve	to	overcome	time-inconsistent	preferences,	be	it	to	
preempt	 state	 collapse	 and	 secure	 the	 peaceful	 settlement	 of	 conflicts	 (Moravcsik	 2000;	
Simmons	 and	 Danner	 2010),	 or	 economic	 prosperity	 (Milner	 and	 Büthe	 2009;	 Deere	
2009).66	
Incorporation	adds	 to	actors’	 cost-benefit	 calculations.	First,	delegates	expect	distributional	
consequences	 from	 putting	 a	 policy	 into	 practice.	 High	 adaption	 costs	 can	 make	 the	
implementation	of	international	rules	prohibitive	(Deere	2009).	Policy	out-	comes	may	even	
run	 counter	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 signatories	 (Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen2013).	 For	 example,	
Hafner-Burton	and	Tsutsui	(2005)	point	to	the	fact	that	while	rogue	governments	benefit	from	
signing	 human	 rights	 treaties,	 they	 prefer	 these	 policies	 not	 to	 become	 effective.	 Second,	
governments	may	 fear	bad	 reputation	 from	 failing	 to	 follow	up	on	their	promise	(Carrubba	
2005;	Keohane	1984).	This	implicit	enforcement	fails,	however,	if	defection	can	go	unnoticed	
and	 interest	 groups	 do	 not	 hold	 sway	 over	 their	 governments	 (Dai	 2007;	 Hafner-Burton	 and	
Tsutsui	 2005;	 Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen	 2013).	 Finally,	 dispute	 settlement	 mechanisms	 can	
impose	explicit	costs	via	sanctions	(Hafner-Burton	and	Tsutsui	2005;	Deere		2009).	
                                                        
6 Governments may even strategically use ratification – rather than signing an 
agreement – to bolster their  legitimacy  (Hafner-Burton  and  Tsutsui  2005;  
Schimmelfennig 2000). 
  
 
Governments	chose	their	strategy	on	the	basis	of	 the	expected	outcome	from	signing	
and	incorporating	 from	 three	 scenarios.	 First,	 if	signing	an	agreement	is	beneficial	and	
governments	expect	an	overall	positive	return	from	incorporating	the	policy,	they	cooper-	
ate	 in	both	stages.	They	adopt	a	policy	and	 incorporate	 it	 swiftly.	Second,	governments	
refrain	from	even	signing	an	agreement,	if	there	is	little	to	gain	from	the	signature	alone	
and	 if	 incorporation	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 negative	 consequences.	 Finally,	 governments	
make	 empty	 promises	when	 signing	 an	 agreement	 is	 beneficial	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
they	expect	incorporation	to	be	costly.	 If	non-incorporation	has	little	consequences,	too,	
then	governments	can	benefit	from	signing	while	at	the	same	time	saving	follow-up	costs.	
They	readily	adopt	a	policy,	but	prefer	to	prevent	its	incorporation.	
Empty	 promises	 run	 counter	 the	 intuition	 of	 credible	 commitment	 theory	 where	
governments	explicitly	self-impose	non-trivial	ex-ante	or	ex-post	costs	(Fearon	1994;	Martin	
2005;	Simmons	and	Danner	2010).	Governments	are	purposefully	misleading	and	they	
are	being	rewarded	for	doing	so.	 	Why	would	anybody	continue	to	interact	with	such	a	
government?	Or	put	differently:	What	are	the	conditions	under	which	a	government	can	
make	empty	promises?	
In	 practice,	 empty	 promises	 are	 possible,	 because	 the	 addressees	 of	 the	 government’s	
message	 are	 often	miopic.	 Given	 the	 complexity	 of	 international	 trade	 policies,	 audiences	
have	a	limited	attention	span.	The	promise	to	cooperate	and	the	actual	change	in	conduct	are	
often	 perceived	 as	 two	 unrelated	 events	 instead	 of	 a	 single	 one	 made	 up	 of	 two	 stages.	
Audiences	 focus	 on	 governments’	 immediate	 claims	 rather	 than	 evaluating	 promises	on	a	
more	encompassing	level.	 For	example,	in	times	of	economic	crisis,	inter-	 national	markets	
react	 immediately	 when	 governments	 announce	 new	 trade	 policies	 and	 not	 when	 they	
implement	them.	Magee,	Brock	and	Young	(1989)	argue	that	under	such	conditions	voters	
accept	ambiguous	signals	and	end	up	rewarding	even	policy	platforms	that	are	against	their	
interest.	 Recent	 empirical	work	 stresses	 that	 democratic	 governments	 can	 exploit	 voters’	
incapacity	strategically	 (Kono	2006).	Governments	negotiate	and	adopt	 trade	policies	 that	
favour	 particular	 pressure	 groups,	 but	 thwart	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 larger	 share	 of	 the	
population.	Eager	to	keep	their	voters’s	support,	governments	obfuscate	their	real	intentions	
by	for	example	raising	the	technical	complexity	of	policies.	In	short,	governments	make	use	of	
constituents’	incapacity	and	seek	to	veil	noncompliance	–	in	particular	when	the	timing	of	the	
follow-up	event	cannot	be	clearly	identified	(Keohane	1997).	
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Expected		Incorporation	Behaviour	
Incorporation	has	two	observable	components:	it	is	a	binary	choice	and	at	the	same	time	
it	can	take	different	amounts	of	time.	 If	governments	clearly	benefit	from	a	policy,	 they	
successfully	 incorporate	after	a	 short	period	of	 time.	 In	contrast,	 if	 a	policy	offers	 little	
advantages,	 governments	 are	 less	 eager	 to	 incorporate	 swiftly.	They	 take	 considerable	
time	to	incorporate,	thus	de-facto	vetoing	agreements	ex-post.	
	
Empty	Promises	in	Mercosur	
	
Governments	make	empty	promises	for	different	reasons.	 In	the	first	case,	governments	
sign	Mercosur	agreements	to	signal	their	sustained	interest	in	regional	cooperation	and	
market	 friendly	 economic	policy	making.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 they	 try	 to	 evade	
the	 implementation	 of	 and	 compliance	 to	 costly	 policies.	 	 In	 Latin	 America,	 regional	
cooperation	 occurs	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 economies	 in	 development	 and	 profound	
pro-cyclical	business	cycles	(Wibbels	2006).	Commitment	to	regional	cooperation	has	an	
important	signaling	function	and	thus	helps	solve	the	time	inconsistency	problem	(Büthe	
and	Milner	2008;		Pevehouse		2002).	
Intraregional	 conflicts	 among	member	 governments	may	 overshadow	 these	positive	
effects		(Gómez-Mera		2013).	Governments		need		to		reassure		others		that		despite	their	
differences,	they	do	not	question	regional	cooperation	per	se:	To	counterbalance	severe	
crises,	they	‘deepen’	cooperation	and	adopt	policies	that	explicitly	regulate	further	policy	
areas	(functional	scope)	or	even	promise	more	centralised	governmental	cooperation	
(level	of	centralisation).7	
However,	 in	 Mercosur	 these	 kind	 of	 promises	 are	 particularly	 unlikely	 to	 be	 kept.	 While	
adopting	 these	 policies	 sends	 a	 clear	message	 about	 the	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 first	
instance,	 they	 will	 cause	 considerable	 adaption	 costs	 when	 eventually	 put	 into	 practice.	
Deepening	cooperation	means	opening	up	 the	 traditionally	 well-protected	 Latin	 American	
economies	to	regional	trade,	exposing	domestic	companies	to	competition	and	thus	triggering	
opposition	of	strong	domestic	interest	groups.	 Governments	are	therefore	highly	 inclined	to	
defect.	After	all,	non-cooperation	is	hard	to	detect	since	incorporation	records	are	not	public.	
Explicit	 enforcement	 of	 agreements	 involve	 diplomatic	 costs,	 which	 is	 why	 in	 practice	
                                                        
7 See Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfenning (2013) for the dimensions of 
differentiated integration. 
  
 
members	only	rarely	resort	to	these	dispute	settlement	mechanisms.		
To	conclude,	during	short	term	conflicts	over	single	but	salient	issues,	governments	signal	
the	 survival	 of	 the	 regional	 integration	 project	 by	 jointly	 adopting	 policies	 that	 ‘deepen’	
Mercosur’s	 polity.8	 These	 agreements,	 however,	 can	 only	 be	 put	 into	 practice	 against	 the	
opposition	of	domestic	interest	groups.	Since	this	is	particularly	costly,	governments	have	an	
interest	in	delaying	or	even	in	vetoing	the	incorporation	of	these	policies.	
		
H1:	The	more	intraregional	conflict	at	the	moment	of	signing	a	policy,	the	longer	it	takes	
to	 incorporate	 a	 policy	 that	 suggests	 deeper	 and	 more	 functionally	 diverse	 regional	
cooperation.	
	
In	the	second	case,	democratically	elected	governments	use	their	signature	to	appeal	to	
their	 electorate.	 But	 promises	 remain	 unkept	 whenever	 policy	 adaptions	 are	 costly.	
Political	actors	benefit	from	presenting	themselves	as	proactive	and	entrepreneurial	lead-	
ers	realising	national	interests	in	international	negotiations	–	a	behaviour	often	observed	
with	Latin	American	leaders	at	regional	summits	(Dabene	2009;	Rogoff	1990;	Whitehead	and	
Barahona	de	Brito	 2005).	 The	more	 popular	 regional	 cooperation,	 the	more	 eager	 are	
politicians	to	make	use	of	the	diplomatic	stage.	Governments	again	turn	to	contracts	that	
diversify	 or	 centralise	 the	 regional	 polity,	 because	 it	 portrays	 them	 as	 proactive	 and	
cosmopolitan	 leaders.	
Once	 more,	 Mercosur’s	 low	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 sanctioning	 capabilities	 allow	
politicians	 to	 easily	 suspend	 incorporation	 in	 the	 foresight	 of	 costly	 political	
consequences.	 Politicians	 sign-off	 regional	 policies	 that	 promise	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation,	
knowing	that	they	can	easily	veto	ex-post.	
Not	all	delegates,	however,	follow	this	logic.	Only	democratically	accountable	decision-	
makers	 who	 care	 for	 popular	 support	 engage	 in	 this	 kind	 of	 window	 dressing.	 In	
Mercosur,	while	political	leaders	convene	in	the	Common	Market	Council,	the	other	two	
decision	 bodies	 are	 made	 up	 of	 administrative	 ranks.	 Domestic	 preferences	 tempt	
politicians	 from	 the	 Common	 Market	 Council	 to	 make	 empty	 promises,	 but	
administrators	 from	 the	 Common	 Market	 Group	 and	 the	 Trade	 Commission	 remain	
                                                        
8 For the effect of an increase in intraregional conflict on the adoption of policies 
regarding ‘deeper’ cooperation, please  see  the  online appendix. 
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unaffected.	When	regional	cooperation	is	popular,	politicians	easily	adopt	highly	visible	
and	salient	policies	decisions	about	the	further	centralisation	and	functional	differentiation	
of	Mercosur.	But	these	signatures	are	a	mere	façade.		Given	the	pronounced	transaction	costs	
during	 implementation,	 the	 incorporation	of	policies	on	 ‘deeper’	cooperation	adopted	 in	
the	Common	Market	Council	at	high	levels	of	domestic	support	for	regional	cooperation	is	
likely	to	be	slow.	
	
H2:	 When	 Mercosur’s	 popularity	 is	 high,	 elected	 politicians	 in	 the	 Common	 Market	
Council	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 make	 empty	 promises	 than	 at	 low	 levels	 of	 popularity.	 In	
consequence,	 policies	 that	 politicians	 adopt	 regarding	 the	 functional	 diversification	and	
stronger	centralisation	will	take	more	time	for	incorporation.	
	
	
	
Alternative	Explanations	
Empty	promises	are	not	the	only	reason	for	non-incorporation.	Authors	with	often	legal	
backgrounds	 criticise	 Mercosur’s	 limited	 regulatory	 capacities.	 Even	 though	 this	
literature	 only	 rarely	 refers	 to	 other	 empirical	 cases	 of	 international	 cooperation,	 its	
arguments	are	often	quite	 similar	 and	 can	be	 structured	along	 the	 lines	of	 established	
distinctions	between	managerial	 and	preference	 related	accounts	 (Simmons	2010;	 von	
Stein	2013).9	
Managerial	explanations	in	the	tradition	of	Chayes	and	Chayes	(1995),	Victor,	Raustiala	
and	Skolnikoff	(1998)	or	Weiss	and	Jacobson	(1998)	argue	that	in	principle,	governments	
keep	 the	 promises	 from	 the	 negotiation	 table.	 International	 negotiations	 require	
considerable	 investments	 in	 terms	of	 time	and	human	resources.	Only	 those	willing	 to	
comply	bear	the	necessary	transaction	costs.	Non-incorporation	is	most	likely	accidental	
and	not	the	result	of	strategic	defection.	
First,	Mercosur’s	purely	intergovernmental	decision	making	 matters.	Delegations	rarely	
meet	in	person	and	only	a	few	times	per	year.	Staff	rotate	too	frequently	and	cannot	 follow	
up	 on	 the	 incorporation	 of	 regulations	 they	 draft	 themselves	 (Gonzáles	 Garabelli	 2004).	
                                                        
9 9For	an	overview	over	relevant	mechanisms	to	incorporation	and	ratification	processes	
in	other	contexts	than	Mercosur	see	Simmons	(2010);	Treib	(2008);	and	von	Stein	(2013).	
  
 
Given	 scarce	 administrative	 resources,	 decision	 bodies	 are	 dramatically	 overcharged		
(Peña	 	 2003;	 	 Ventura	 and	 	 Perotti	 2004;	 	 Zalduendo	 	 1998).	 	 	 Mercosur’s	 agreements	
therefore	 often	 lack	 the	 sufficient	 level	 of	 technical	 and	 juridical	 scrutiny.	 In	 return,	 if	
delegates	 can	 address	 juridical	 and	 technical	 details,	 incorporation	 is	much	 less	 error	
prone	and	occur	comparably	swiftly.	Steunenberg	and	Kaeding	(2009)	find	similar	effects	
for	the	transposition	of	maritime	directives	in	the	EU.	
For	the	same	reason,	Mercosur’s	delegations	grapple	with	complex	regulations.	Policies	
that	 define	many	 comprehensive	 changes	 to	 a	 status	quo	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 error	
prone.	Any	obstacles	during	the	incorporation	process	immediately	translate	into	longer	
and	more	exhaustive	incorporation	processes.	 The	less	complex	a	policy	the	more	 likely	
swift	 incorporation.	 In	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	 directive	 delays	
transposition	 in	 an	 important	 way	 (Haverland	 and	 Romeijn	 2007;	 Kaeding	 2006;	
Zhelyazkova		2013).	
Insufficient	 coordination	 among	 Mercosur’s	 delegations	 and	 domestic	 counterparts	
contributes	to	policy	incompatibility.	Delegates	often	fail	to	recognise	administrative,	legal	
or	 constitutional	 realities	 of	 member	 states,	 causing	 technical	 and	 juridical	 problems	
(Bouzas	and	Soltz	2001a;	Bouzas	et	al.	2008;	Geneyro	2003).	Domestic	actors	responsible	
for	incorporation	such	as	national	ministries	(Peña	2003)	or	parliaments	(Perotti	et	al.	2004;	
Ventura	and	Perotti	2004)	 therefore	need	 to	mitigate	ex-post.	 The	 number	 of	 relevant	
domestic	actors	delegations	need	to	consult	when	drafting	a	policy	drive	the	transaction	
costs	 of	 coordination.	 More	 coordination	 effort	 means	 less	 capacity	 to	 address	 the	
complexity	of	different	preferences	properly	and	incorporation	 takes	longer	(Buchanan	
and	Tullock	1962).	Similar	effects	have	again	been	found	in	the	European	Union		(Borghetto	
2007).	
Not	all	policies	regulate	an	issue	for	the	first	time.	The	further	Mercosur	progressed,	the	
more	 often	 do	 governments	 alter	 existing	 Mercosur	 rules	 already	 adopted	 before.	
Studies	on	the	European	Union	have	found	different	effects	from	amending	rather	than	
newly	regulating	issues.	Some	argue	that	amendments	mostly	refine	existing	policies	and	
are	incorporated	swiftly	(Borghetto,	 Franchino	 and	 Gianetti	2006;	Mastenbroek	2003).	
Others	challenge	this	view	and	contend	that	re-adjusting	policies	enforces	actors	to	change	
established	routines	 and	 behaviour,	 causing	 higher	 transaction	 costs	 and	 in	 consequence	
more	comprehensive	incorporation	processes	(Falkner,	Treib,	Hartlapp	and	Leiber	2005).	
I	 suggest	 to	 investigate	 and	 control	 for	 this	 mechanism,	 but	 leave	 the	 result	 open	 to	
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empirical	scrutiny.	
Finally,	 some	 refer	 to	 the	 constitutions’	 legal	 traditions	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 they	
relate	domestic	to	 international	 law	(Bergamaschine	Mata	Diz	2005;	Nascimento	2004;	
Pena	 and	Rozemberg	2005).	 In	monist	 constitutions,	 international	 law	has	precedence	
over	 domestic	 law.	 Dualist	 constitutions,	 in	 contrast,	 posit	 that	 international	 and	
domestic	law	are	two	distinct	spheres.	Since	international	law	is	between	states	and	not	
between	 individuals,	 it	 is	 less	 powerful	 than	 domestic	 law.	 The	 legal	 procedures	 for	
incorporation	are	less	demanding	under	a	monist	constitution	than	under	 a	 dualist	 one.	
Brazil	and	Paraguay	are	the	two	members	with	constitutions	in	a	more	dualist	tradition,	
hence	incorporation	should	take	longer	than	in	Uruguay	or	Argentina	(Bouzas	et	al.	2008).	
Preference	related	arguments	highlight	actors’	strategic	behaviour.	Weak	states	 try	 to	
use	regional	cooperation	to	hedge	the	influence	of	larger	states	(Gómez-Mera	2005).		At	the	
same	 time,	 the	powerful	 states	use	 the	 regional	block	 to	project	power	 (De	Lima	and	Hirst	
2006;	 Spektor	 2010)	 and	 consolidate	 their	 regional	 leadership	 (Eichengreen	and	Frankel	
1995;	Malamud	2011;	Vigevani,	 Favoron,	 Ramanzini	 and	 Correia	2008).	Member	states’	
bargaining	 power	stems	from	the	strong	asymmetry	 in	the	 levels	of	 intraregional	trade	
interdependence	 (Gómez-Mera	 2013).	 Ultimately,	 the	 economies	 of	 Paraguay	 and	Uruguay	
are	in	relative	terms	much	more	involved	with	its	Mercosur	partners	than	the	economies	
from	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil.	 Those	 who	 depend	 little	 on	 intraregional	 trade	can	rather	
easily	 cooperate	 with	 countries	 outside	 the	 regional	 block.	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil	 are	
capable	 of	 translating	 this	 autonomy	 into	 direct	 power	 at	 the
negotiation	table.	They	find	it	particularly	easy	to	realise	their	preferences	in	regional	negotiations	and	are	
ultimately	more	likely	to	incorporate	policies	correctly	and	swiftly	(Fearon	1998).	 In	the	European	Union,	
Mbaye	(2001)	expects	a	similar	influence	from	bargaining	power	on	the	transposition	of	directives.	
Bargaining	 power,	 however,	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 trade	 interdependence,	 only.	 Chairing	 international	
summits	 has	 been	 found	 to	 be	 yet	 another	 important	 way	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 negotiations	
(Tallberg	2006,	2010).	The	power	 from	chairs	derives	 from	 their	 informational	 advantages.	They	are	 in	
close	contact	with	all	delegations	and	gain	insights	into	the	real	bargaining	position	of	other	parties.	They	
also	 set	 the	 agenda,	structure	negotiations,	administer	voting	and	summarise	results.	 Due	to	Mercosur’s	
strong	intergovernmental	character	with	a	rotating	presidency	hosting	all	Mercosur	meetings	during	this	6-
month	period,	chairs	should	have	a	particularly	distinct	influence	on	negotiation	results	(Tallberg	2010).	If	a	
government	 is	 in	 charge,	 it	 finds	 it	 much	 more	 easy	 to	 realise	 the	 own	 preferences	 during	 the	 own	
presidency	and	will	incorporate	those	policies	particularly	swiftly.	
  
 
Mercosur’s	rules	for	incorporation	prevent	that	member	states	free-ride	on	their	partners’	efforts.	Free-
riding	 can	occur,	 if	 governments	benefit	 from	public	 goods	without	having	 to	bear	 the	 related	 adaption	
costs.		In	contrast,	Mercosur’s	members	generate	their	public	goods	with	a	step-level	production	function	
(Elster	and	McPherson	1993;	Ostrom	2003)	–	only	the	last	country	that	incorporates	determines	when	the	
agreed	behaviour	is	binding	and	cooperation	is	fully	triggered	(Bouzas	et	al.	2008;Geneyro	2003).10	
	
Policies	that	are	typically	capable	of	producing	externalities	conducive	to	free-riding	do	not	do	so	in	
Mercosur.	The	common	external	tariff	is	a	point	in	case.	Once	a	new	tariff	becomes	valid,	unilateral	defection	
pays	off	and	the	country	that	offers	more	favourable	conditions	benefits	from	more	trade.	But	since	
regulations	are	legally	binding	only	when	the	last	member	incorporates,	tariffs	are	implemented	jointly	in	
Mercosur	and	can	only	lead	to	benefits	for	all.	The	incorporation	of	regulations	regarding	the	common	
external	tariff	should	therefore	not	take	more	time	for	incorporation	than	other	policies.	
	
	
	
Mercosur’s	Incorporation	Gap	
Despite	numerous	references	to	Mercosur’s	incorporation	problems	in	the	literature,	only	few	studies	relate	to	
the	phenomenon	empirically	(Caetano	and	Perina	2003;	Nascimento	2004;	Perotti	et	al.	2004;	Rivas	2006;	
Ventura,	Onuki	and	Medeiros	2012).	The	restricted	access	to	the	Secretariat’s	existing	complete	data	base	
on	 incorporation	behaviour	represents	an	 important	impediment.	This	paper	relies	on	three	different,	but	
overlapping	subsamples	of	the	database	from	Mercosur’s	Secretariat.	It	is	the	first	one	to	present	and	analyse	
the	 complete	 incorporation	 record	 of	 all	 1033	 policies	 adopted	 between	 1994	 and	 2008	 that	 require	
incorporation,	adding	up	to	3560	incorporation	processes	in	the	four	member	countries.11	
	
	
Measuring	Incorporation	and	Its	Determinants	
                                                        
10 In general, international agreements may foresee different rules as to when exactly policies 
become legally binding. In some cases – like the European Union – a member government who 
incorporates a directive suffices to trigger immediate validity in this particular country. In other 
cases, policies take effect  only  after a previously  agreed  threshold has been  reached.   For 
example, the Kyoto Protocol foresees in its Art.25 that at least 55 states that also account for at least
55% of CO2 emissions need to deposit their instruments of ratification. In the extreme case, like in 
Mercosur, all countries need to legally commit before a policy enters into force in all signatory 
states. These incorporation rules have important consequences for the strategic character of 
international cooperation. The respective quora determine when domestic courts can enforce 
international law and when exactly signatory states jointly produce collective goods (Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer 1970; Schelling 1973). 
11 Not all of Mercosur’s policies have to be incorporated by all four members, which is why the 
overall number of incorporation cases is not 4 X 1033 = 4132 
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How	large	is	Mercosur’s	incorporation	problem?	Even	though	some	use	the	term	“Mercosur	syndrome”	as	a	
general	 label	 to	 describe	 non-compliance	 (Vaillant	 2007),	 Mercosur	 displays	 average	 levels	 of	 non-
incorporation	when	compared	to	other	cases	(Gray	2014). 
	
	
FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE	
Figure	1	Incorporation	record	of	Mercosur’s	member	states	over	the	course	of	the	years.	
	
The	study	quantifies	Mercosur’s	incorporation	in	two	ways.12	Figure	1	charts	the	fraction	of	
successfully	 incorporated	 regulations	 as	 measured	 in	 each	 year.	 Incorporation	 initially	
plummeted	in	1996,	but	has	been	increasing	ever	since	and	reaches	a	level	between	63.0%	in	
Uruguay	 and	 75.7%	 in	 Brazil	 in	 2008.	 Since	 1997,	 while	 Brazil	 seems	 to	 perform	 best,	
Uruguay	is	worst	and	Argentina	and	Paraguay	are	usually	in	between.	
	
Incorporation	also	has	a	time	dimension.	Figure	2	shows	the	days	that	members	spend	on	
incorporation,	calculated	as	the	difference	between	the	date	of	adoption	in	Mercosur	and	the	
date	 of	 incorporation	 of	 the	 respective	 domestic	 legal	 instrument.	 	 The	 lighter	 box-plots	
display	durations	for	successfully	 incorporated	regulations,	the	darker	ones	summarise	the	
durations	of	non-incorporated	cases	as	of	2008.	Successful	incorporation	 is	on	average	quite	
swift.	The	median	incorporation	duration	is	389	days	for	Argentina,	
	
FIGURE	2	ABOUT	HERE	
Figure	2	Incorporation	duration	of	incorporated	and	non-incorporated	policies	in	
Mercosur.	
	
207	days	for	Brazil,	439	days	for	Paraguay	and	348	days	for	Uruguay.	The	distribution	of	
the	 values	 is	 right	 skewed,	 with	 extreme	 values	 beyond	 the	 range	 of	 1.5	 times	 the	
interquartile	range.	While	the	majority	of	the	policies	is	incorporated	swiftly,	some	of	the	
policies	 receive	 attention	only	 after	 several	 years	have	 gone	by.	 The	durations	of	 non-	
incorporated	cases	are	more	evenly	distributed	with	median	values	ranging	from	1851	
days	in	Argentina,	1813	days	in	Brazil,	1446	days	in	Paraguay	to	1820	days	in	Uruguay.	
The	variation	within	the	countries	is	quite	large.	Mercosur’s	members	adopted	some	of	
                                                        
12 In contrast to other regional organisations (see Hartlapp and Falkner 2009), successful 
incorporation and its timing can be exactly identified for 92.95% of all cases. Usually, Mercosur’s 
members use one legal instrument for incorporation. Since 2002, decision CMC 20/02 obliges the 
members to use only one single domestic legal instrument. Governments occasionally made use of 
several legal measures only in early years. I rely on the first legal measure notified in those cases. 
  
 
the	policies	only	recently	which	is	why	these	policies	can	only	be	observed	over	a	short	
time	span.	 In	other	cases,	member	governments	have	been	taking	already	more	than	10	
years	for	 incorporation.	
Covariates	operationalise	the	political	and	administrative	context	of	the	incorporation	
process,	and	characteristics	of	the	policies	themselves.	The	main	explanatory	variables	of	
interest	are	the	level	of	conflict	between	member	countries	and	the	popularity	of	regional	
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cooperation	 in	 the	 electorate.	 	 Gómez-Mera	 (2008,	 	 2013)	 measures	 the	 perceived	 level	 of	
conflict	 among	 member	 states	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 media	 coverage.	 She	 devises	 a	 yearly,	
aggregate	 index	 that	 takes	 on	 average	 3.39	 and	 varies	with	 a	 standard	 deviation	 of	
4.73. The	 Latinobarómetro-surveys	 include	 questions	 about	 the	 popularity	 of	 regional	
economic	cooperation	on	a	yearly	basis.13	I	calculate	the	support	for	regional	cooperation	
for	each	country	and	year	and	impute	any	missing	values	(Honaker	and	King	2010).	Only	a	
small	part	of	Mercosur’s	population	takes	an	explicitly	negative	stance	towards	regional	
cooperation.	 On	 average,	 81.26%	 of	 the	 population	 (standard	 deviation	 6.57)	 are	not	
against	regional	economic	cooperation.	
Further	 variables	 address	 the	 respective	 observable	 implications	 from	 alternative	
explanations.	Mercosur’s	 policies	may	 carry	 an	 appendix	with	 technical	 or	 regulatory	
details.	 Policies	featuring	such	a	document	are	more	likely	to	be	the	result	of	 elaborate	
preparation.	 On	 average,	 technical	 appendices	 indicate	 that	 delegates	 were	 more	
attentive	when	drafting	a	policy.	 In	Mercosur,	60.68%	of	all	polices	carry	such	an	annex.	
Complexity	 can	be	operationalised	with	an	 index	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 length	of	 a	policy	
(Franchino	2000)	and	the	references	to	already	existing	policies	(Krehbiel	1991).			The	
number	of	words	and	the	number	of	paragraphs	measure	the	length	of	a	policy.14	I	also	
count	the	referrals	 to	existing	regional	regulations	 in	the	preamble.	After	decomposing	
the	 variance	 of	 all	 three	 measures	 into	 their	 principal	 components,	 the	 respective	
principle	component	scores	of	each	regulation	allow	to	interpret	policy	complexity	on	a	
common,	latent	scale	(Bartholomew,	 Steele,	Moustaki	 and	Galbraith	2008;	Joliffe	2002).	
The	mean	of	this	variable	for	the	pooled	sample	is	at	0.1615	and	has	a	standard	deviation	
of	1.36.	The	index	from	Beck,	Clarke,	Groff,	Keefer	and	Walsh	(2001)	is	a	standard	scale	to	
capture	the	veto	players	of	 the	respective	domestic	 political	 system	 in	 a	 given	 year.	 It	
takes	a	mean	of	3.83	(standard	deviation	1.21).	Next,	Mercosur’s	policies	explicitly	state	
in	their	preamble	if	they	amend	and	overrule	
	
	
	
                                                        
13 Please see online appendix for the recoding of the respective  questions. 
14 Both values are log transformed to account for their skewed distributions. 
15 The principal component score was calculated using all Mercosur regulations–
meaning those that require incorporation, but also those that do not explicitly 
demand it. 
  
 
Table	1	Descriptive	statistics	for	three	categorial	variables.	
	
n	
	
Decision	Bodies	
CMC	 599	
CMG	 and	 TC	 2961	
Countries	
Argentina	 870	
Brazil	 882	
Paraguay	 929	
Uruguay	 879	
Policies	
Common	External	Tariff	 725	
Governmental	Cooperation	 800	
Mercosur	Interna	 104	
Internal	Market	 87	
Tariff	Exception	 276	
Technical	Regulations	 1537	
Others	 31	
	
	
already	 existing	 legislation.	 In	 Mercosur,	 14.88%	 of	 all	 policies	 fall	 into	 this	 category.	
Bargaining	power	allows	to	realise	the	own	interest	and	secure	more	favourable	terms	in	
international	negotiations.	Since	Mercosur’s	policies	do	not	always	concern	all	countries,	
Argentina	has	 to	 incorporate	 870	Mercosur	policies,	 Brazil	 882	policies,	 Paraguay	929	
policies	and	Uruguay	879	policies.	Second,	Mercosur’s	members	share	the	presidency	on	a	
rotating,	 6-months	 based	 scheme.	 A	 dummy	 identifies	 those	 policies	 a	 country	 signs	
during	 the	 own	 presidency	 –	 on	 average	 24.26%.	 Mercosur’s	 policies	 can	 be	 categorised	
according	to	six	policy	types:	725	cases	relate	to	the	common	external	tariff;	800	announce	
‘deeper’	governmental	cooperation;	in	104	cases,	the	policies	concern	Mercosur	itself;	87	
incorporation	processes	relate	to	the	internal	market;	276	cases	define	exceptions	from	
the	common	external	tariff;	1537	cases	concern	technical	regulations	and	finally	31	cases	
could	not	be	attributed	to	any	category.	Lastly,	fixed	effects	control	for	the	respective	decision	
bodies.	Of	all	3560	incorporation	processes,	politicians	in	the	Common	Market	Council	adopted	
599	policies	and	bureaucrats	in	the	Common	Market	Group	and	the	Trade	Commission	adopted	
2961	policies.	
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Modeling	Incorporation	Behaviour	
Hazard	rate	models	not	only	ask	whether	incorporation	is	successful,	but	also	how	much	
time	 a	 government	 takes	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 unit	 of	 analysis	 –	 here	 a	Mercosur	 policy	 in	a	
member	 country	 –	 enters	 the	 observation	 period	with	 the	 status	 as	 non-incorporated	
policy	 and	 alters	 this	 discrete	 state	 after	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 time.	 Depending	 on	
covariates,	 the	 probability	 that	 incorporation	 occurs	may	be	 high	 at	 earlier	 or	 at	 later	
stages	 (Box-Steffensmeier	 and	 Jones	 1997;	 Johnson	 and	 Albert	 1999):	 While	
incorporation	is	likely	to	be	swift	in	the	first	case,	it	will	be	rather	slow	in	the	second.	A	
Weibull	 distribution	 parameterises	 the	 baseline	 probability	 that	 an	 event	 occurs	 given	
that	it	has	not	taken	place	yet.16	Table	2	presents	regression	results	from	the	multivariate	
hazard	rate	model	(n	=	3560).	 As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	further	below,	results	
indicate	 that	 in	 addition	 to	management	 failures	 and	 the	 abuse	 of	 negotiation	 power,	
empty	promises	are	an	important	impediment	to	incorporation	in	Mercosur.	
The	main	variables	of	interest	are	in	line	with	theoretical	expectations.		The	level			of	
governmental	 conflict	 during	 the	 negotiations	 does	 not	 affect	 incorporation	 in	 the	
baseline	category.	 	But	the	interaction	between	the	level	of	conflict	and	the	policies	 on	
governmental	cooperation	is	statistically	different	from	0	at	a	95%	confidence	level	and	
indicates	more	time	until	successful	incorporation	for	higher	levels	of	conflict.	
Similarly,	 public	 support	 for	Mercosur	 is	 not	 systematically	 related	 to	 the	 expected	
time	 necessary	 to	 incorporate.	 But	 Mercosur’s	 decision	 bodies	 make	 an	 important	
difference.	When	 the	 Common	Market	 Council	 adopts	 a	 policy,	 higher	 levels	 of	 public	
support	for	Mercosur	lead	to	longer	incorporation	in	comparison	to	those	adopted	in	the	
Common	Market	Group.	 In	 contrast,	when	 the	Trade	Commission	adopts	policies,	 high	
                                                        
16 The distribution assumes proportional effects from the covariates on the baseline 
rate. I examine this assumption for a Cox-model with the Therneau-Grambsch test 
(see Grambsch and Therneau 1994). The global test reports its violation for all 
variables. The standard remedy would be interactions with some transformation of 
time (Keele 2010; Licht 2011).  It does not mitigate the problem in any of the cases. 
Further robustness checks with specifications that do not require either 
assumptions lead to similar results in magnitude and error margin. In addition, 
from a theoretical perspective, a monotonic duration dependence is a plausible way 
to think about the incorporation process. The Weibull distribution therefore seems 
to be an appropriate distribution to model non-incorporation. 
 
  
 
levels	of	public	support	lead	to	swifter	incorporation.		Both	interaction	effects		report	
standard	errors	at	standard	levels	of	statistical	significance.	The	interaction	effects	are	
opposite	to	the	effect	from	the	decision	body	fixed	effects,	alone.	
Further	 variables	 control	 for	 alternative	 explanations.	 The	 existence	 of	 an	 annex	 is	
associated	with	less	time	necessary	for	incorporation	with	statistical	evidence	for	an	effect	
different	from	0.	Next,	policy	complexity	correlates	positively	with	longer	incorporation	
processes,	but	the	coefficient	 is	not	statistically	different	from	0.	 In	similar	veins,	more	
veto	players	at	the	time	of	adopting	a	policy	require	more	time	for	incorporation.	 Again,	
the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 estimate	 is	 slightly	 too	 large	 to	 report	 an	 effect	 on	 a	
conventionally	 accepted	 confidence	 level.	 	 Policies	 that	 explicitly	 refer	 to	 existing			
legislation	lead	to	expect	more	time	for	incorporation	at	a	statistically	significant	level.	
Preference	 related	 factors	 also	 affect	 incorporation	 in	 Mercosur.	 Regarding	 the	
bargaining	 	 power	 of	 the	 member	 countries,	 Brazil,	 followed	 by	 Argentina	 and	 then	
Paraguay,	 all	 incorporate	more	swiftly	 than	Uruguay.	 A	member	country	 that	holds	 the	
presidency	 in	 Mercosur	 during	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 policy	 incorporates	 it	 more	 swiftly	
afterwards.	All	of	these	effects	are	statistically	significant.	
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Table	2	 Estimation	 results	 from	 survival	model	 (Weibull	Distribution).	 The	 reference	
categories	 for	 the	dummy	variables	 are	 as	 follows.	 Countries:	Uruguay;	Deci-	
sion	bodies:	all	policies	adopted	by	the	Common	Market	Group;	Policy	types:	all	
policies	regulating	the	common	external	tariff.	All	fixed	effects	for	the	pol-	 icy	
types	are	in	the	model	–	the	table	only	reports	results	for	the	interactions	with	
the	conflict	level.	
	
	 Coeff.	 SE	
(Intercept)	 5.63	 (0.45)	
Conflict	Level	 -0.01	 (0.01)	
Mercosur	Support	 0.00	 (0.01)	
CMC	 -1.73	 (0.92)	
TC	 4.16	 (1.21)	
Argentina	 -0.20	 (0.07)	
Brazil	 -0.65	 (0.08)	
Paraguay	 -0.19	 (0.08)	
Veto	Player	 0.05	 (0.03)	
Meeting	in	Own	Country	 -0.19	 (0.06)	
Complexity	 0.04	 (0.02)	
Annex	 -0.15	 (0.06)	
Overruling	Existing	Policies	Policy	
on	
Governmental		Cooperation	
0.26	
	
1.20	
(0.08)	
	
(0.12)	Mercosur	Interna	 0. 3	 ( .26 	
Internal	Market	 1.26	 (0.22)	
Tariff	Exception	 -0.04	 (0.16)	
Technical		Regulations	 1.46	 (0.10)	
Others	 2.14	 (0.60)	
CMC		X		MCS	Support	 0.04	 (0.01)	
TC		X		MCS	Support	 -0.04	 (0.01)	
Conflict	Level	X	Governmental	Cooperation	 0.04	 (0.02)	
Conflict	Level	X	Mercosur	Interna	 0.05	 (0.03)	
Conflict	Level	X	Internal	Market	 -0.07	 (0.06)	
Conflict	Level	X	Tariff	Exception	 -0.06	 (0.03)	
Conflict	Level	X	Technical	Regulations	 0.01	 (0.01)	
Conflict	Level	X	Others	 -0.03	 (0.14)	
Log(scale)	 0.25	 (0.02)	
Log	Likelihood	 -19959.8	
N	 3560	
  
 
	
Finally,	the	model	contains	a	series	of	fixed	effects	that	distinguish	between	different	
types	of	policy.	The	baseline	category	are	 regulations	concerning	 the	common	external	
tariff.	Only	exceptions	from	the	common	external	tariff	take	less	time	for	incorporation.	
All	 other	 categories	 require	 more	 time.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 policies	 regulating	
Mercosur	 itself	and	exceptions	 from	the	common	external	 tariff,	all	 fixed	effects	report	
standard	errors	small	enough	to	refute	the	null-hypothesis.	
	
	
Empty	Promises,	Management	Problems	and	the	Abuse	of	Negotiation	 Power	
The	results	from	the	multivariate	analysis	show	that	Mercosur’s	non-incorporation	is	a	
story	of	empty	promises,	management	problems	and	the	abuse	of	negotiation	power.	 In	
the	first	example	for	empty	promises,	delegations	sign	agreements	on	deeper	cooperation	
during	high	levels	of	conflict,	because	it	allows	signaling	a	sustained	interest	in	Mercosur	
despite	single,	salient	disputes.	However,	due	to	the	high	adaption	costs	of	these	policies,	
member	state	governments	are	reluctant	 to	 incorporate	 them.	Figure	3(a)	displays	 the	
effect	 from	 regional	 crises	 on	 incorporation.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 estimated	 regression	
equation,	I	simulate	the	expected	time	for	incorporation	at	different	conflict	levels	(King,	
Tomz	 and	 Wittenberg	 2000).	 What	 happens	 to	 the	 expected	 time	 necessary	 for	
incorporation	if	the	level	of	conflict	rises	from	0	(2.5%	quantile)	to	18.5	(97.5%	quantile)?	
The	figure	shows	how	incorporation	changes	when	the	conflict	level	increases	by	18.5	points	on	
the	index.	Under	control	of	all	other	factors,	incorporation	will	take	on	average	2454	days	more.	
In	contrast,	the	level	of	conflict	is	unrelated	to	the	incorporation	process	of	all	other	policies.	The	
uncertainty	of	the	expected	time	for	incorporation	is	too	large	to	clearly	expect	a	swifter	
incorporation	process.	
		
The	 reason	 for	 this	 behaviour	 are	 empty	 promises.	 At	 first,	 governments	 easily	
contract	 over	 future	 cooperation	 during	 times	 of	 conflict,	 because	 they	 benefit	 from	
displaying	commitment	to	the	regional	agreement.	But	while	Mercosur’s	members	make	
promises	 about	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation,	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 intend	 to	 keep	 them.	
Incorporation	of	and	later	compliance	to	these	agreements	is	costly.	Governments	prefer	
not	to	put	the	terms	of	the	agreements	into	legal	practice.	And	given	they	do	not	have	to	
fear	 immediate	 consequences	 from	 non-incorporation	 such	 as	 losing	 reputation	 or	 explicit	
sanctions	by	a	third	party	arbiter,	they	refrain	from	doing	so.	
The	most	prominent	example	are	Brazil’s	and	Argentina’s	economic	crises	at	the	turn	
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of	the	millennium	(Bouzas	2003;	Malamud	2005).	The	events	spurred	a	number	of	trade	
disputes	 between	 1999	 and	 2002,	 leading	 Mercosur’s	 members	 to	 engage	 in	 fierce	
debates	over	the	trade	of	chicken,	car	tires	and	sugar,	amongst	others.	Politicians	needed	
to	cater	for	these	concerns	out	of	electoral	considerations	and	had	to	protect	important	
domestic	 interest	 groups.	 Despite	 of	 these	 conflicts,	 however,	 governments	 ensured	
other	 international	 partners	 and	 investors	 that	 they	 still	 intended	 to	 continue	 regional	
cooperation	 and	 adhere	 to	market	 friendly	 economic	 policies	 (Gómez-Mera	 2009,	 2013).	 In	
consequence,	Mercosur’s	member	governments	initiated	a	prominent	campaign	to	relaunch	
the	regional	integration	project	(el	Relanzamiento	del	Mercosur	),	contracting	over	a	broad	
array	 of	 institutional	 innovations	 and	 further	 governmental	 cooperation.This	 relaunch,	
however,	never	lived	up	to	solemn	vows	on	paper	(Bouzas	2001;	Gómez-	Mera	2013;	Malamud	
2005).	
Empty	 promises	 also	 occur	 when	 politicians	 are	 eager	 to	 impress	 their	 electorate.	
Governments	 sign	 policies	 that	 announce	 further	 Mercosur	 cooperation	 for	 electoral	
reasons	while	Mercosur	is	popular.	But	governments	are	unassertive	incorporators	if	the	
implementation	of	a	particular	policy	is	very	costly,	for	example	in	the	case	of	policies	on	
the	further	functional	diversification	and	stronger	centralisation	of	Mercosur’s	polity.	
Again,	I	simulate	the	effect	from	an	increase	of	the	central	explanatory	variable	–	here	the	
citizens’	 support	 of	 regional	 economic	 cooperation	 –	 from	 a	 comparably	 low	 level	 at	
70.4%	 (2.5%	 quantile)	 to	 a	 high	 level	 at	 89.8%	 (97.5%	 quantile).	 I	 then	 calculate	 the	
resulting	 difference	 in	 the	 expected	 incorporation	 duration	 for	 policies	 on	 ‘deeper’	
cooperation	that	politicians	adopt	in	the	Common	Market	Council	and	those	bureaucrats	
adopt	in	the	other	decision	bodies	(figure	3(b)).	
If	politicians	sign	agreements,	a	 leap	 in	Mercosur’s	popularity	has	marked	effects	on	
subsequent	incorporation	of	policies	on	‘deeper’	cooperation.	On	average,	the	simulated	
rise	of	19.4	percentage	points	in	Mercosur’s	popularity	leads	to	expect	2893	more	days	
for	 incorporation.	 In	 contrast,	 public	 opinion	 takes	 virtually	 no	 substantive	 effect	 if	
bureaucrats	sign	such	policies.	
This	at	first	sight	counterintuitive	result	–	the	more	in	favour	the	population	towards	
regional	 cooperation,	 the	 longer	 it	 takes	 to	 enact	 regional	 policies	 domestically	 –	 is	 a	
consequence	 from	 empty	 promises.	 Politicians	 contract	 for	 matters	 of	 a	 positive	 and	
proactive	image.	At	the	same	time,	they	make	use	of	voter’s	limited	capacity	to	follow	up	
on	 the	 details	 of	 international	 trade	 governance	 (Kono	 2006;	 Magee,	 Brock	 and	 Young	
  
 
1989).	 Delaying	 or	 even	 vetoing	 incorporation	 comes	 at	 virtually	 no	 price.	 Politicians	
make	empty	promises	about	deeper	cooperation	in	Mercosur,	because	they	benefit	from	
announcing	them,	but	can	easily	prevent	their	legal	 validity.	
But	empty	promises	are	not	the	only	reason	for	non-incorporation.	Management	issues	
challenge	 the	 swift	 and	 correct	 incorporation	 of	 Mercosur	 policies.	 The	 slow	
incorporation	 of	 policies	 without	 a	 technical	 annex	 indicates	 that	 a	 more	 thorough	
preparation	 does	 indeed	 reduce	 obstacles	 during	 the	 incorporation	 process.	 More	
complex	 policies	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 contradict	 existing	 legislation.	 Similarly,	 member	
governments	require	 more	time	to	incorporate	those	policies	that	explicitly	change	the	
status	 quo.	 More	 veto	 players	 increase	 the	 necessary	 coordination	 of	 interests	 when	
drafting	 a	 policy,	 resulting	 in	 more	 error	 prone	 legislation	 and	 more	 time	 for	
incorporation.	
In	addition,	preference	related	issues	play	an	important	role.	Whoever	chairs	Mercosur’s	
meetings	seeks	to	make	use	of	the	own	superior	bargaining	position	to	the	detriment	of	their	
partners’	 interest.	 Similarly,	more	economically	 independent	member	countries	 find	 it	
more	easy	 to	realise	 their	policy	goals.	 The	swift	 incorporation	of	exceptions	 from	 the	
Common	External	Tariff	fits	into	the	picture.	These	policies	are	the	government’s	attempt	to	
appease	 interest	groups	(Gómez-Mera	2005)	and	serve	governments	 to	 increase	the	political	
viability	of	the	regional	cooperation	scheme	(Olarreaga	1998).	Since	incorporating	these	
agreements	 is	 highly	 beneficial,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 this	 group	 of	 policies	 finds	 the	
immediate	attention	of	governments.	In	addition,	incentives	for	free-riding	do	not	seem	to	
cause	Mercosur’s	incorporation	issues.	If	motives	for	free-riding	exist,	we	would	observe	
much	 longer	 durations	 for	 policies	 regulating	 the	 common	 external	 tariff.	 Bargaining	
strength	 therefore	makes	much	more	of	a	difference	 to	 subsequent	 incorporation	 than	
fundamental	differences	in	member’s	institutional	context	such	as	the	legal	 traditions	of	
the	 respective	 constitutions.	 If	 monist	 constitutions	 were	 an	 important	 advantage,	 in	
particular	Argentina	and	Uruguay	should	incorporate	policies	much	more	easily.	
	
	
	
Empty	Promises	and	International	
Cooperation	
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Mercosur’s	 founding	members	Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	Uruguay	 adopted	1033	
regulations	 between	 1994	 and	 2008,	 but	 incorporated	 only	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	 them.	
Analysing	 this	 data	 with	 a	 multivariate	 hazard	 rate	 model,	 this	 study	 shows	 that	
Mercosur’s	 incorporation	 problem	 has	multiple	 causes.	 Empty	 promises	 constitute	 an	
important	 stumbling	 block	 to	 incorporation	 in	 Mercosur.	 In	 addition,	 managerial	
problems,	 but	 also	 the	 abuse	 of	 negotiation	 power	 cause	 longer	 or	 even	 vetoed	
incorporation	processes.		Free-riding	does	not	affect	incorporation.	
The	study	makes	several	contributions.	 In	analysing	Mercosur’s	complete	incorporation	
record	 of	 all	 policies	 adopted	 between	 1994	 and	 2008,	 it	 offers	 comprehensive	 and	
empirically	 grounded	 insights	 into	 the	 determinants	 of	 incorporation	 behaviour	 in	
Mercosur.	Focussing	on	the	consequences	from	its	institutional	design,	this	study	adds	to	
the	understanding	of	Mercosur’s	rules	for	incorporation	(Bouzas	et	al.	2008),	the	effects	
from	 its	 intergovernmental	 enforcement	mechanisms	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 information	about	
the	status	quo	of	incorporation	(Perotti	2002;	Zalduendo	1998).	
Moreover,	the	paper	adds	empty	promises	as	an	important	mechanism	to	explain	non-	
incorporation	 in	 regional	 integration,	 thus	offering	valuable	 insights	 to	an	 increasingly	
comparative	 literature	 (Börzel	 and	 Risse	 2012;	 Gray	 2014;	 Malamud	 2010).	 The	 paper	
furthers	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 institutions	 affect	 international	 cooperation.	 When	
governments	do	not	need	to	 fear	consequences	 from	non-compliance,	 signatures	alone	
may	be	reason	enough	for	contracting.	Empty	promises	(Deere	2009;	Hafner-Burton	and	
Tsutsui	 2005),	window	dressing	 (Mearsheimer	 1994)	 or	moribund	hard-law	 (Marcoux	and	
Urpelainen	2013)	then	are	an	important	behavioural	outcome	of	a	particular	institutional	
design.	
International	cooperation	is	apparently	not	only	about	creating	rules	that	serve	to	mu-	
tually	adjust	states’	behaviour	(Keohane	1984).	The	“assumption	of	a	general	propensity	of	
states	 to	 comply	 with	 international	 obligations”	 (Chayes	 and	 Chayes	 1995:3)	 might	
require	some	qualification.	In	international	relations,	not	all	agreements	are	made	to	be	
kept.	Claiming	international	cooperation	can	be	reason	enough	to	sign	international	law.	
	
FIGURES	3a)	AND	3b)	ABOUT	HERE	
	
	
	 	 	 	
  
 
	
??? Governments	 use	 signing	 to	 signal	
sustained	 interest	 in	 regional	
cooperation	 despite	 high	 levels	 of	
conflict,	 but	 seek	 to	 avoid	 the	 high	
adaption	 costs	 from	 policies	 on	
governmental	 cooperation.	How	much	
incorporation	 delay	 if	 the	 level	 of	
regional	 conflict	 raises	 from	 0	 (2.5%	
quantile)	 to	 18.5	 (97.5%	 quantile)?	
Expected	 difference	 in	 incorporation	
duration	 for	 governmental	
cooperation	 on	 the	 left	 and	 all	 other	
policies	 on	 the	 right.	 Conflict	 level	 as	
measured	by	Gómez-Mera	(2013).	
??? Politicians	in	the	CMC	use	signing	to	
create	 a	 positive	 image	 among	 their	
electorate,	 but	 seek	 to	 avoid	 the	 high	
adaption	 costs	 from	 policies	 on	
governmental	 cooperation.	 How	much	
incorporation	delay	if	the	popular-	ity	of	
regional	cooperation	raises	from	70.4%	
(2.5%	 quantile)	 to	 89.8%	 (97.5%	
quantile)?	 Expected	 difference	 in	
incorporation	 duration	 for	 policies	 on	
governmental	 cooperation	 for	 the	 CMC	
on	the	left	and	the	CMG	and	TC	on	the	
right.	 Popularity	 as	 measured	 by	 the	
Latinobarómetro.	
	
Figure	 3	 Governments	 easily	 adopt	 policies	 that	 offer	 benefits	 from	
merely	signing	them,	but	seek	to	avoid	those	that	are	costly	to	
incorporate.	 These	 empty	 promises	 cause	 systematically	
delayed	 incorporation.	 	Results	 from	simulations	with	all	other	
covariates	 held	 at	 their	 mean.	 Points	 indicate	 the	 expected	
difference,	bars	indicate	the	central	95%	uncertainty.	
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